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Ireland Goes Bananas: Irish Insider
Trading Law and Price-Sensitive
Information After Fyffes v. DCC
By JEREMIAH BURKE*
Introduction
On December 21, 2005, the Irish High Court ruled on the most
significant insider trading case in Irish legal history. The trial lasted
for 87 days during 2005 and Justice Mary Laffoy's ruling is 155 pages
long.1 There has been very little insider trading litigation in the Irish
state.2 This case marks the first time a plaintiff invoked the civil
remedies of Part V of Ireland's Companies Act of 1990 to seek the
recovery of profits resulting from alleged insider dealing.'
The plaintiff, Fyffes PLC, had the burden of proving that James
Flavin, a non-executive director of Fyffes, possessed "price-sensitive
information" at the time of the suspect dealing. Determining whether
non-public information is price-sensitive requires applying a
hypothetical test: whether, if generally available, the information
would have materially affected the price of Fyffes' shares. The test is
applied from the standpoint of a reasonable investor.
Justice Laffoy held that Flavin did not possess price-sensitive
* J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007; Ph.D.
in Philosophy, University of California, Riverside; M.A. in Philosophy, University
College Cork, Ireland.
1. Colm Kenna, Fyffes Loses E106m Insider Dealing Case, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 22,
2005, available at <www.ireland.com/newspaper/front/2005/1222/
844257380HM1LEAD.html>; Fyffes v. DCC PLC, [2005] I.E.H.C. 477 (Ir.)
[hereinafter Fyffes]. Page references in Fyffes are to the case as it appears in
LexisNexis under "Irish Reported and Unreported Cases."
2. Irene Lynch-Fannon, Enforcement and Compliance in Irish Company Law:
All Law and No Enforcement or the Dawn of a New Era, INSOLVENCY L.J. 14-24
(2002).
3. Fyffes at 86.
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information at the time of his dealing. Part I of this note describes
the parties and disputed transactions in Fyffes v. DCC. Part II
provides an overview of Irish insider trading law, and Part III covers
the key issues and rulings of the case. Part IV compares Irish and
American securities law and examines whether Flavin's actions would
be considered insider trading in the United States. Part V further
analyzes the key issues and rulings of Fyffes v. DCC, questioning the
Irish statutory focus on "price-sensitive information" and Justice
Laffoy's application of the hypothetical test for determining whether
information is price-sensitive.
I. The Facts of Fyffes v. DCC
A. The Parties
The plaintiff, Fyffes PLC, is controlled by the McCann family.
The McCann business of importing bananas and other fruit into
Ireland began in a warehouse in Dublin in 1951. Today, Fyffes is
Europe's largest importer and distributor of fruits and vegetables and
is listed on the Dublin and London Stock Exchanges.4 James Flavin
had been a non-executive director of Fyffes since 1981 and a close
friend of the McCann family. He resigned from the board of Fyffes in
February 2000.
Development Capital Corporation Limited ("DCC"), S&L
Investments Limited ("S&L"), James Flavin, and Lotus Green
Limited are the four defendants in the case. James Flavin is the chief
executive of DCC. Today, DCC is primarily a sales and marketing
company. In December 1981, DCC acquired a 9.46 percent stake in
Fyffes, and Flavin became a non-executive director of Fyffes. A
subsidiary of DCC sponsored Fyffes' public floatation in 1981, and by
the end of the 1980s, the DCC group's stake in Fyffes grew to 10.5
percent. After its own public floatation in 1994, DCC divested itself
of shares in Fyffes when the correct opportunity presented itself.
S&L and Lotus Green are wholly-owned subsidiaries of DCC.
In order to mitigate liability for capital gains tax when selling shares
in Fyffes, DCC and S&L sold their Fyffes shares to a subsidiary,
4. Companies Act 1990 Part V, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL NEWSLETTER
(Matheson Ormsby Prentice, Dublin), Summer 2005, at 2, available at
<www.mop.ie/dynamic/files/Corporate%20Newsletter%20Summer%202005.pdf>.
5. Ed Micheau, Bitter Fruit, SUNDAY Bus. POST ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2004, available
at <archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2004/11/14/story4l180943.asp>.
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Lotus Green, in August 1995. Shortly thereafter, Lotus Green
became resident in the Netherlands for tax purposes. The DCC
Group set up Lotus Green as part of a tax avoidance scheme. As a
Dutch company, Lotus Green's sale of Fyffes shares is not subject to
Irish capital gains tax.6 Flavin was a director of S&L at the time of the
suspect dealing, but he was never a director of Lotus Green
B. The Disputed Transactions
Fyffes' financial year ran from November 1 to October 31. On
December 14, 1999, Fyffes' board of directors publicly announced
preliminary financial results for 1999, stating that the company had
continued record growth and that they expected 2000 to be "another
year of further growth for Fyffes. '' 8 However, on January 6, 2000, the
directors, including Flavin, received a trading report for November
1999 showing that sales for the month were £10.1 million below
budget and £1.7 million worse than sales in November 1998. 9 The
November Trading Report also stated that losses of C2.6 million in
November 1999 were E2.3 million worse than budget, and E4.1 million
worse than the previous November."0
On January 25, 2000, the directors received the December
Trading Report which also contained bad news. Total sales for
December were £149 million, £11.3 million below budget and £6.1
million lower than the year before." The December Trading Report
forecasted that January profits would be only E1.3 million, compared
to a budget of E5 million, and to £6.3 million in profits the year
before.
2
Despite Flavin's possession of the non-pubic information in these
two trading reports, on February 3, 8, and 14, 2000, Lotus Green sold
all of its shares in Fyffes, grossing an excess of £106 million, and
making a profit of £85 million. Fyffes held its Annual General
Meeting ("AGM") on March 20, 2000. At the AGM, Fyffes'
6. Since the High Court ruled that Flavin was an agent in the share sales, the
DCC Group may now be liable for tax in Ireland on the E85 million profit.
7. Fyffes at 3.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 5. See also Fyffes v. DCC: The Case for the Prosecution, SUNDAY Bus.
POST ONLINE, July 10, 2005, available at <archives.tcm.ie/businesspost/2005/0710/
story6272.asp>.
10. Fyffes at 5.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 8.
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chairman announced that:
[M]arket conditions in the last two months of 1999 were
significantly below expectations. The usual recovery in the first
month of calendar 2000 has been slower than anticipated,
particularly because of the continuing weakness of the Euro against
the dollar. As a result, we expect that the performance for the first
half of the year, on a like for like basis, will be below that achieved
for the same period last year.
13
Fyffes' share price peaked on February 18 at C3.98. By March
17, it fell back to C3.16. After the profit warning announced at the
AGM on March 20, the share price closed that day at C2.70. Fyffes'
share price fell 25 percent in the two days after the profit warning. By
the end of April, the price fell to 11.85."4
At the end of November 2001, the Irish Stock Exchange passed
on a file concerning DCC's disposal of its shareholding in Fyffes to
the Director of Public Prosecutions. In January 2002, shortly before
the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, Fyffes brought a
claim against Flavin, DCC, and its two subsidiaries. Fyffes alleged
that Flavin used inside information from the November and
December trading reports to sell Fyffes' shares prior to their price
decline.
II. Irish Insider Trading Law
The term "insider trading" connotes "a person buying or selling
some asset in a market place who, by virtue of his unique position or
other special circumstances, possesses information concerning that
asset's value which is unknown to others in the market., 16 British law
made insider trading a criminal offense in 1980." Irish law followed
suit in Part V of the Companies Act of 1990.18 Along with the
Companies Act of 1963, the Companies Act of 1990 is one of the
principal statutes regulating corporate activities in Ireland. 9 Section
108(1) of the 1990 Act states that:
It shall not be lawful for a person who is, or at any time in the
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id.
15. Micheau, supra note 8.
16. MICHAEL FORDE, COMPANY LAw 206 (3d ed. 1999).
17. Id. at 207.
18. Id.
19. Fyffes at 11.
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preceding 6 months has been, connected with a company to deal in
any securities of that company if by reason of his so being, or
having been, connected with that company he is in possession of
information that is not generally available, but, if it were, would be
likely materially to affect the price of those securities. 20
Section 111 of the 1990 Act also imposes criminal liability on those
engaged in insider trading.
Fyffes v. DCC is a civil action taken under section 109 of the 1990
Act. Section 109 provides that a person engaged in insider trading
shall be liable "to account to the company that issued or made
available those securities for any profit accruing to the first-
mentioned person from dealing in those securities., 21  L.P. Flynn
argues that the 1990 Act's provision for civil liability is one of the
principal ways in which the Act departs from, and improves upon, the
British model in effect at the time.2 Establishing civil as opposed to
criminal liability "requires a lower standard of proof and creates an
incentive for those who have suffered to pursue the insider for
compensation." ' Fyffes took advantage of this provision by suing the
defendants. Fyffes claimed to be acting "in the best interests of
shareholders., 24 Fyffes wanted the defendants to account to Fyffes
for the €85 million profit made by the share sales.
III. Key Issues and Rulings in Fyffes v. DCC
The two key issues in the case were whether James Flavin
"dealt" in shares of Fyffes in February 2000 and whether he was in
possession of "price-sensitive information" at the time of the share
sales.
A. Dealing
Section 107 of the 1990 Companies Act states that dealing "in
relation to securities, means (whether as principal or agent) acquiring,
20. Companies Act, 1990 (Act No. 108/1990) (Ir.), available at
<www.irishstatutebook.ie/ZZA33Y1990S108.html>.
21. Id.
22. L. P. Flynn, Insider Trading in Ireland: The New Regime, INT'L CO. &
COMMERCIAL L.REv. 361, 366 (1991).
23. Id.
24. Carl McCann, Vice Chairman, Presentation at Fyffes Annual General
Meeting: Performance and Financial Strength 18 (May 29, 2002), available at
<ww7.investorrelations.co.uk/fyffes/finreports/AGM02pdf.pdf>.
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disposing of, subscribing for or underwriting the securities. ' Flavin's
defense team argued that it was Lotus Green, not Flavin, who dealt in
the Fyffes shares. Justice Laffoy dismissed the contention that Flavin
personally dealt in the Fyffes shares. She acknowledged that since
Flavin had neither a legal nor a beneficial interest in the Fyffes
shares, he did not have the capacity to dispose of them as a principal.26
However she ruled that Flavin dealt in the shares as an agent for the
DCC group.27 Flavin had total control of the sale and prospective
buyers negotiated with Flavin and no one else.'
B. Price-Sensitive Information
Nevertheless Justice Laffoy held that Flavin was not in
possession of price-sensitive information at the time he dealt in the
shares. Hence his dealing was not unlawful under section 108 of the
1990 Companies Act. The information would only have been price-
sensitive if it were not generally available, or if it were generally
available, then if "it would have been likely to materially affect the
price of Fyffes' shares.,
29
Fyffes alleged that the information contained in the November
and December trading reports satisfied this hypothetical test. At first
glance, Fyffes' argument looks like a strong one. Soon after the 1990
Companies Act came into effect, L. P. Flynn speculated that even
though materiality is not defined in the Act, "[o]ne might wish to
gauge this factor by reference to the actual effect which the public
release of the information has on the price of the security."" Using
this test for materiality, the fact that Fyffes' share price fell 25 percent
in the two days following Fyffes' March AGM would seem to pose a
serious problem for Flavin. However Justice Laffoy ruled otherwise
on this "overriding issue" in the case."
Given the centrality of the concept of "price-sensitive
information" to the case, it is interesting to note that the term does
not appear in Part V of the Irish Companies Act 1990. As Justice
Laffoy points out, the term is a "convenient shorthand."32 Justice
25. Fyffes at 13.
26. Id. at 70.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 86.
30. Flynn, supra note 25, at 364.
31. Fyffes at 85.
32. Id. at 94.
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Laffoy quotes a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal which
points out that the "argot speaks of such information as 'price-
sensitive' when what is really meant is price-material., 3  In other
words, the issue of materiality in section 108(1) "goes to the
materiality of the share price effect."34
The source of the concept "price-sensitive information" is a
European Council Directive. Part V of the Irish Companies Act 1990
implemented the Irish state's obligation under the Council Directive
of November 13, 1989, coordinating European regulations on insider
dealing.35  The Council Directive defines inside information as
"[i]nformation which has not been made public of a precise nature
relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities... which, if
it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the
price of the.., securities in question. ' Article 2 of the Directive
requires each member state to prohibit persons in possession of inside
information from taking advantage of that information by acquiring
or disposing of securities to which the information relates. 7
The legislative purpose of the European Directive is similar to
the legislative purpose underlying United States federal securities
law.38 The Directive's objective is "to provide assurance to investors
that they are placed on equal footing and that they will be protected
against improper use of inside information, thus obviating the
undermining of confidence in, and the smooth running of, the
market."3 Justice Laffoy refers to the Second Circuit's account of the
policy underlying Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5: "[T]he Rule is based in policy on the justifiable
expectation that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information... The dominant
congressional purposes... were to promote free and open securities
markets and to protect the investing public from suffering inequities
in trading. 4°
33. Id. (quoting Cooke, P. in Colonial Mut. Life Assurance Ltd. v. Wilson Neill
Ltd. [19941 2 N.Z.L.R. 152, 161 (C.A.)).
34. Fyffes at 95.
35. Id. at 11; Council Directive 89/592/EEC 1989 O.J. (L 344) 30, available at
<www.legaltext.ee/text/en0TlOll.htm>. See also Flynn, supra note 25, at 362.
36. Fyffes at 11.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 86-87. See also SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848, 858
(1968).
2007]
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Because both the European Directive and American securities
law seek to uphold an expectation that all investors operate on equal
footing, Justice Laffoy feels justified in using the jurisprudence of the
United States federal courts because it provides "guidance as to how
section 108(1) is to be interpreted and applied."4' In particular, she
looks to American accounts of the concept of materiality in
determining how to construe section 108(1)'s hypothetical test.
IV. Comparing Irish and American Securities Law
A. How Would Fyffes v. DCC Have Been Decided Under American
Securities Law?
How would an American court have viewed Flavin's actions?
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it
unlawful to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate.., for the protection of
investors. 4 2 Rule 10b-5(c) makes it unlawful to "engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person" in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security. 3
In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) decided that a corporate insider must abstain
from trading in shares of his corporation unless he has first disclosed
all material inside information known to him." For a corporate
insider to remain silent when he has a duty to disclose is deceitful and
hence a violation of Rule 10b-5(c). Cowdin, a director of Curtiss-
Wright, told a broker-dealer that the corporation's board of directors
had decided to declare a dividend at a reduced rate.45  The
information had not yet been made public. The broker-dealer placed
two sell orders and when the dividend announcement was made, the
SEC suspended trading in Curtiss-Wright because of the large
number of sell orders.
In finding that there had been a violation of federal securities
41. Fyffes at 86.
42. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).
44. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
45. Id. at 2.
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law, the SEC stated:
An affirmative duty to disclose material information has been
traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly officers,
directors, or controlling stockholders. We... have consistently
held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to
them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons
with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these
circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions.
If, on the other hand, disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale
would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we
believe the alternative is to forgo the transaction.46
The SEC also explained that this duty to disclose or abstain from
trading derives from the insider's privileged relationship to the
corporation:
[T]he existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.47
Applying these principles, Flavin's dealing would be considered a
violation of U.S. securities law. Like Cowdin, the director of Curtiss-
Wright, Flavin used advance notice of bad news to sell shares in his
company before the share price fell. In Cady, Roberts, the SEC
focused on whether Gintel, the broker-dealer, as well as Cowdin, the
corporate insider, had a duty to disclose or abstain from selling the
securities. As the SEC put it, "Cowdin's relationship to the company
clearly prohibited him from selling the securities affected by the
information without disclosure. By logical sequence, it should [also]
prohibit Gintel." If Cowdin was clearly prohibited from dealing,
then under federal securities law, Flavin would also have been
prohibited from dealing.
However Flavin's information differed somewhat from the
information available to the corporate insider in Cady, Roberts.
Flavin's information was not about an impending reduced dividend
announcement. Before we can conclude that Flavin's actions would
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id.
2007]
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have violated American securities law, we have to determine whether
the information Flavin possessed was material. As the SEC pointed
out in Cady, Roberts:
While there may be a question as to the materiality and significance
of some corporate facts and as to the necessity of their disclosure
under particular circumstances, that is not this case. Corporate
dividend action of the kind involved here is clearly recognizable as
having a direct effect on the market value of securities and the
judgment of investors. 9
Can it similarly be argued that the information contained in the
November and December Trading Reports was of a kind that would
have a direct effect on the market value of Fyffes' shares?
B. Material Information in American Securities Law
The U.S. Supreme Court defined the concept of material
information in TSC Industries v. Northway.5 ° In TSC Industries, a
minority shareholder in an acquired corporation claimed that a proxy
statement was materially misleading in violation of section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9. 1  In
responding to the allegation, the U.S. Supreme Court was concerned
about setting the materiality threshold too low. The Court rejected a
lower court formulation of the materiality test formulated in terms of
information a shareholder "might" consider important . To establish
materiality, the plaintiff has to show that the information "would" be
important. 3 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote.., there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as havin~ significantly altered the "total mix"
of the information available. _
In Basic v. Levinson, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
the standard of materiality set forth in TSC Industries also applies in
49. Id. at 6.
50. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 425 U.S. 438 (1976).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 449.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.5  The defendant
corporation Basic denied three times that it was engaged in merger
negotiations with another corporation, Combustion." Former
shareholders of Basic sued the merged corporation, arguing that they
sold their stock based on the denials of a merger.57 Borrowing from
the Second Circuit's analysis in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the
Supreme Court determined that materiality in the context of
preliminary merger negotiations depends on "a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in the light of the totality of the company
activity.""
C. The Hypothetical Test in Section 108(1)
Based on the principles derived from these cases, Justice Laffoy
formulated the hypothetical test in Section 108(1) of the Companies
Act of 1990:
[H]ad it been available to [the reasonable investor on February 3, 8,
and 14], the information contained in the November and December
Trading Reports, viewed by him against the "total mix" of
information available about Fyffes' trading and earnings available
on those dates, would have impacted on the judgment of the
reasonable investor in relation to an investment decision about
Fyffes' shares to the extent that he would have concluded that the
information probably would have a substantial effect on Fyffes'
shares. 9
For Justice Laffoy changes in a corporation's stock price reflect
changes in investor expectations concerning future earnings and cash
flows.' Based on this premise, Justice Laffoy considers "whether,
had it been available on the dates of the share sales, the information
contained in the November and December Trading Reports would
have altered investors' expectations about Fyffes' future earnings and
cash floWS.
6 1
To answer this question, Justice Laffoy borrows from the
55. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
56. Id. at 227.
57. Id. at 228.
58. Id. at 238. See also Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
59. Fyffes at 96.
60. Id. at 144.
61. Id.
2007]
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language of TSC Industries by indicating that we must consider the
information contained in the November and December trading
reports in relation to the "total mix" of information generally
available in early February 2000. This total mix of information
included the following:
1. Fyffes' Preliminary Announcement on December 14, 1999,
which stated that going forward Fyffes would focus on returns
from its core business, pursue cost-cutting measures and
address oversupply in the banana market. Justice Laffoy
viewed as particularly relevant the information that financial
benefits of Fyffes' attempt to deal with oversupply would not
be felt in the first quarter." This Preliminary Announcement
also pointed to the possibility of major future acquisitions and
that Fyffes' balance sheet indicated it had the wherewithal to
do so.
2. Fyffes' announcement regarding progress in the development
of its online venture, wof.com [worldoffruit.com]. 63
3. Reports by market analysts and the media regarding Fyffes'
positive prospects. There were media rumors about Fyffes
merging with one of its major competitors and it looked like
Fyffes was going to be ahead of its competitors in developing a
business-to-business online fresh produce market.64
4. Investor enthusiasm for companies with an Internet
component, which was fueling the rise in Fyffes' share price. 65
Justice Laffoy argued that the negative news in the two trading
reports had to be assessed in the context of this total mix of
information.
On the issue of price-sensitivity, Justice Laffoy holds that a
reasonable investor would not have viewed this negative information
as indicating "a lowering of expectations about Fyffes' earnings.., of
an order of magnitude that would probably impact on Fyffes' share
price to a substantial or significant degree."' Justice Laffoy thought
it was too early in the financial year for a reasonable investor to draw
such an inference in early February. Looking at the total mix of
62. Id. at 144.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 145.
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information, "prospects for a merger or a major acquisition and the
potential of the wof.com venture ... would offset the impact of the
current trading problems.,17 The "strength of the sentiment for the
wof.com venture" was a big factor for Justice Laffoy.6 She concludes
that "the plaintiff has not discharged the onus of proving that at the
dates of the Share Sales Mr. Flavin, by reason of his connection with
Fyffes, was in possession of information which, if generally available,
would have been likely to materially affect the share price.,
69
V. Key Issues and Rulings in Fyffes v. DCC
A. Vincent Browne's Criticisms
In "The Curious Ethics of Corporate Ireland," Vincent Browne,
a prominent Irish broadcaster and journalist, raised cogent criticisms
of Justice Laffoy's decision.' As we saw above, Fyffes' share price
fell 25 percent in the two days after the March 20 profit warning.
Browne asks "if this disclosure caused such a market reaction, how is
it believable there would not have been a market reaction ... had the
information made known internally on 25 January been public
knowledge?""
Browne essentially argues that the market reaction on March 20
and 21 indicates that the information in Flavin's possession at the end
of January was price-sensitive. As previously mentioned, L. P. Flynn,
in a law review article on Part V of the 1990 Companies Act,
suggested that just such a market reaction might be a good indicator
of whether information is material. Professors William Wang and
Marc Steinberg draw attention to American cases that hold that the
market's reaction to information can be a factor in determining the
materiality of information. 7 But Justice Laffoy points out that a later
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Vincent Browne, The Curious Ethics of Corporate Ireland, VILLAGE.IE, Dec.
29, 2005, at <www.village.ie/ireland/feature/the curiousethics of corporate.
ireland/> (visited Mar. 3, 2005).
71. Id.
72. L. P. Flynn, supra note 25, at 365.
73. 1 WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINGBERG, INSIDER TRADING 4-20 (2d
ed. 2005). See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The
significance of this information to investors is highlighted by... the virtually
immediate jump in the price of St. Joe stock from approximately $30 per share to
2007]
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event can only be a "valid proxy" for what could have happened
earlier if there is parity of information and if the market conditions
were the same on both dates.74 Justice Laffoy determines that neither
of these two conditions is satisfied in the present case.
Justice Laffoy admits that answering the hypothetical question
posed by Section 108(1) is a "peculiarly difficult [task] because of the
unusual market conditions in which Fyffes' shares were trading at the
relevant time. 7 ' However Justice Laffoy is convinced there was no
parity of information between what Flavin knew at the end of
January and what Fyffes made public at its March AGM. To resolve
this issue, Justice Laffoy argues that we have to determine what the
impact of the information in the November and December trading
reports would have been if it had been available at the time of the
share sales.76 This impact would have been conditioned by what the
market already knew about Fyffes. The market knew that Fyffes was
reducing its imports into Europe by 10 percent, but that the benefits
of the reduction would be weighted toward the second half of the
year.77 The Preliminary Announcement in December stated that
Fyffes was vigorously pursuing efficiencies in its cost structures.8
When viewed in the context of this other information, "the
reasonable investor might well have deduced at the beginning of
February 2000 that Fyffes management had not formed the view that
its own expectations for the first half or the full year would not be
met. 79  However the information contained in the March
announcement was "fundamentally different, because by that time,
Fyffes was formally telling the market that it had revised downward
its expectations in relation to the first half and was uncertain whether
it would meet its target for the full year." 8
Justice Laffoy's account of the lack of parity of information
between what Flavin knew in January and what Fyffes told the
market in March is problematic. It is true that there was more
information available in March than in January, but the March
approximately $45 per share when the Seagram tender offer was publicly
announced").
74. Fyffes at 142-43.
75. Id. at 144.
76. Id. at 142.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 143.
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announcement was effectively conveying the bad news about Fyffes'
economic performance that Flavin knew in January. When analyzing
the issue of parity of information, it is not clear why Justice Laffoy
focuses on speculating what the impact of the earlier information
might have been, rather than comparing the two sets of documents
more directly. Nonetheless Justice Laffoy does concede that a
reasonable investor might have deduced from the January
information that Fyffes would not meet its half-year or year-long
expectations." It is true that the March statement was the first time
Fyffes' management announced that Fyffes would not meet its targets
for the first half of the financial year.82 However, Browne thinks a
much stronger inference is warranted on the basis of the November
and December Reports. He points out that "the 25 January
document made it clear performance of the first quarter was well
behind performance in the first quarter of the previous year, so how
could it not be inferred performance for the first six months would
not match performance for the first six months of the previous
year?"83 Justice Laffoy is more cautious than Browne about what a
reasonable investor could deduce on the basis of the January
information. Admittedly one has to be careful that hindsight is not
infecting one's assumptions about what could be inferred.
Nevertheless when comparing what Flavin knew in January and what
Fyffes told the market in March, many would agree with Browne and
conclude that there was parity of information.
The second condition that must be satisfied before a later market
reaction can be treated as a proxy for what could have happened
earlier is that market conditions must be the same at both times.
Justice Laffoy concludes that they were not. She decides that market
conditions had changed significantly by March 20. The market was
different on March 20 because Fyffes' share price had peaked on
February 18 and was in decline after that date.' Justice Laffoy
suggests a number of reasons for the different market conditions.
The downward trend of the share price may have been due to (1)
profit taking, (2) the fact that the demand for Fyffes' shares may have
been satiated by the DCC Group's sell-off of over 10 percent of
Fyffes' shares in February, or (3) an incipient disenchantment with
81. Id. at 142.
82. Id.
83. Browne, supra note 73.
84. Fyffes at 143.
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Internet stocks.85
Justice Laffoy's explanations for the difference in market
conditions raise some questions. Her third explanation for why the
market changed, the stock market crash, is not convincing because it
did not occur until much later in 2000. Also it seems peculiar for
Justice Laffoy to rely on the fact that the market for Fyffes' shares
may have been satiated by the February sell-off as an explanation for
the changed market conditions because this case is precisely about
determining the propriety of that sell-off. Nonetheless, it cannot be
disputed that Fyffes' share price was in decline before March 20.
Justice Laffoy concludes that "what happened on and after 20th
March, 2000 is not a matter which is of evidential value in applying
the hypothesis posited in s. 108(1). " "6
It is also worth noting that even if the market reaction on March
20 and 21 was of evidential value in applying the hypothetical test, the
drop in price is still different from the test itself, and Browne tends to
conflate the two. Browne attempts to show that the information
available to the directors of Fyffes by January 25, 2000, was price-
sensitive based on how the market reacted when similar information
was made public in March. However that is not the test for whether
information is price-sensitive. The test for whether information is
price-sensitive is a hypothetical one based on what a reasonable
investor would have thought about investing in Fyffes if the bad news
had been made public. A post-market event, like the 25 percent fall
in the share price on March 20 and 21, could be of evidential value in
resolving the statutory hypothesis, but it is not itself the same as the
statutory hypothesis. In other words, we do not objectively decide
what would have happened earlier based on what did happen later.
Yet that is exactly what Browne attempts to do.
B. Problems Concerning Price-Sensitivity
Browne's article raises hard questions about Justice Laffoy's
decision in Fyffes v. DCC, but her decision faces other problems as
well. By making the materiality determination under the Section
108(1) test very specific, Justice Laffoy imposes a heavy burden on
the plaintiff. The determination of materiality is always a mixed
question of law and fact,' and it is also important, as the U.S.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450.
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Supreme Court realized in TSC Industries, not to set the threshold of
materiality too low. That would defeat the purpose of securities law
because it would tempt management "to bury the shareholders in an
avalanche of trivial information, a result that is hardly conducive to
informed decision making. '
The question, however, is whether Justice Laffoy sets the
threshold too high. Justice Laffoy acknowledges that "materiality"
applies to a wider range of circumstances in American cases because
it is not tied - as in the Irish context - to the idea of a material
effect on share price.89 Nonetheless the Irish statutory focus on
whether information is price-sensitive makes it harder for a plaintiff
in Ireland to prove materiality than for a plaintiff in the United
States. The plaintiff bears an easier burden in American courts,
because he or she merely has to show a substantial likelihood that the
reasonable investor would consider the information important.9 A
plaintiff could satisfy this test even if he or she could not establish
that the information would be likely to affect the company's share
price. Of course, one of the main ways to demonstrate this in the
United States is to show that disclosure of the fact would have had an
impact on the share price. However "it is well established that a
material fact need not be outcome-determinative." 9' In other words,
a reasonable investor could consider information important, even if
the information would not have led to a change in his or her
investment decision. In Ireland, however, the focus on price-
sensitivity indicates that the omitted information must be shown to be
so important that it would have resulted in a change in investment
decision. An Irish plaintiff has a heavier burden of proof than an
American plaintiff because of this requirement to establish price-
sensitivity.
The same point can be made in another way. When establishing
the materiality of insider information under Irish law, the price-
sensitivity of the information is the only consideration. On the other
hand, when determining the materiality of information in the United
88. Id. at 448-49.
89. Fyffes at 87.
90. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. See also United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641,
648 (8th Cir. 1998) ("substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider
it important to know in deciding whether to buy or sell"); SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42,
47 (2d Cir. 1998) ("substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it
important in deciding how to [invest]").
91. Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1533 (2d Cir. 1991).
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States, price-sensitivity is only one of a number of tests an American
court can use. In addition to the test for price-sensitivity, "trading
(and profit making) by the insiders can [also] serve as an indicia of
materiality." 92 Professors Alan Bromberg and Lewis Lowenfels refer
to this alternative test for materiality as the "cut your own throat"
test.93 An SEC staff accounting bulletin states that "consideration of
potential market reaction to disclosure of a misstatement is by itself
too blunt an instrument to be depended on in considering what is
material."9" Because materiality can be shown in other ways in the
United States, an American civil plaintiff faces less of a burden than
that imposed on the plaintiff in Fyffes v. DCC.
Justice Laffoy could have responded to this concern by pointing
out that the Irish statute requires a focus on the issue of price-
sensitivity. Indeed this focus on price-sensitivity is not an unusual
approach to insider trading outside the United States. Steinberg
notes that jurisdictions such as Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, and Australia also focus on the issue of price-
sensitivity.9  Very few jurisdictions, such as Japan, follow the
American approach. In Japan, material facts are those "which may
have significant influence on the investment decision of investors.
' 6
Steinberg does not comment upon the fact that it is much harder to
prove that information is price-sensitive than it is to prove a
reasonable investor would consider information important.
Steinberg's main thesis is that American markets remain "pre-
eminent" because other jurisdictions tend not to enforce their insider
trading statutes.97 The fact that the plaintiff bears a heavier burden
concerning the issue of materiality in many jurisdictions outside the
United States further supports Steinberg's thesis concerning the pre-
eminence of American markets when it comes to prohibiting or
deterring insider trading.
92. Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 n. 18.
93. A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 6.165 (2d ed. 2003).
94. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 76, 4-23 n. 71.
95. Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading Regulation - A Comparative Analysis, 37
INT'L LAW 153, 163-64 (2003).
96. Id. at 164 n. 107.
97. Id. at 174.
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C. A Problem Concerning Reasonable Investors
A troubling implication of Justice Laffoy's decision is that it
would be difficult to find any insider trader liable if he dealt during
the dot.com mania in Ireland in early 2000. Any bad news from the
company could be offset by the exuberant, irrational investment
mood prevailing at the time. Who is the reasonable investor in the
test for price-sensitive information? In the context of discussing
materiality in the United States, Wang and Steinberg state that it is
"[u]nclear .... whether the Court's reference to 'reasonable investor'
means that materiality is determined from the viewpoint of an
'ordinary investor' or a sophisticated analyst."98 Justice Laffoy sides
with the view that a reasonable investor must be a typical investor. 9
She states that if "that investor, on the evidence, was one who was
anxious to own Internet stocks or stocks with an Internet element, the
likely consequences of such predilection are a relevant factor.""° But
can it really be the case that a reasonable investor would be caught up
in irrational market exuberance for dot.com stocks?
The reasonable investor standard derives from the reasonable
person standard found in tort law, °1 and tort law seems to support
Justice Laffoy's contention. As Professors Diamond, Levine, and
Madden point out:
[W]hile the reasonable person's qualities are those the jury
determines are the expected attributes of those in the community,
the reasonable person cannot be expected to be infallible. Instead,
the reasonable person should possess the weaknesses and frailties
acknowledged in others in the community.'02
Even if we were to depart from Justice Laffoy's view that a
reasonable investor is a typical investor, and instead view the
reasonable investor as more sophisticated, it is worth noting that even
sophisticated market analysts were caught up in dot.com mania
during early 2000. Justice Laffoy points out, for example, that major
98. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 76, 4-52. See also Stephen Thurber, The
Insider Trading Compensation Contract as an Inducement to Monitoring by the
Institutional Investor, 1 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 119, 122-23 (1994) (drawing
attention to this uncertainty in American securities law).
99. Fyffes at 96.
100. Id.
101. RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL §
2.01(3) (2001).
102. JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART MADDEN,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 54 (2d ed. 2000).
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Irish market analysts were reporting positively on Fyffes through
February 2000.03
The troubling implication, however, is that it would be very
difficult for a plaintiff to prevail if the suspect dealing occurred during
a period of irrational exuberance in the marketplace. If a company is
a darling of the stock market - like Google since its initial public
offering - then Laffoy's test suggests that corporate insiders could
often get away with insider trading based on negative non-public
information because the total mix of information about the company
would offset the impact of bad news. It is true that even during the
dot.com era, significant negative news about a company was likely to
cause its stock price to decline, at least on a temporary basis. But if
the kind of irrational exuberance that existed during the dot.com era
is a factor that can be taken into account, then that factor is likely to
offset the effect of a lot of bad news. By focusing on price-materiality
instead of information an investor would consider important, and by
factoring such irrational exuberance into the total mix of information
available, Justice Laffoy's interpretation of the statutory test makes it
difficult for a civil plaintiff to prevail under Irish insider trading law.
D. Rotten Fruit: Fyffes Was Not a Sympathetic Plaintiff
In this particular case, the fact that Justice Laffoy places a heavy
burden on the plaintiff does not seem worrisome. During this long
bench trial, the picture that emerged of Fyffes PLC was not a
flattering one. While these considerations are not direct components
of the Section 108(1) hypothetical test, they may have had an impact
on Justice Laffoy's decision to rule against the Fyffes company.
At the time of the share sales, Fyffes' management clearly did
not think Flavin had possession of price-sensitive information. Even
though the subjective view of the plaintiff should not matter because
the price-sensitivity test is an objective one," it is hard to see why
Fyffes should be able to disgorge the DCC Group of €85 million in
profits when Fyffes clearly did not view the sales at the time as insider
trading.
Three incidents in particular show that Fyffes management did
not think Flavin was engaging in insider dealing at the time. First,
after Flavin sold the first slice of shares on February 3, Neil and
103. Fyffes at 102.
104. Id. at 130.
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David McCann met him that evening at a hotel in Dublin Airport and
congratulated him by buying a bottle of champagne. They
encouraged Flavin to sell the rest of the shares quickly so that they
would not be overhanging the market.'06 These actions are hard to
reconcile with Fyffes' later decision to file a lawsuit against Flavin.
Second, a letter from Fyffes' management to a shareholder,
dated May 11, 2000, shows it did not view the share sales as insider
trading. The shareholder had complained about the drop in Fyffes'
share price after the March AGM.1 ° He queried whether the bad
news released in March should have been made public earlier. Fyffes
replied to the shareholder:
We are satisfied that the company would not have been in a
position to have made a properly informed assessment at an earlier
date. In particular, we are satisfied that an earlier announcement
would not have been merited based solely on the performance in
November and December.'9
Justice Laffoy comments on the contradiction between this letter to
shareholders and the plaintiff's suit against Flavin:
There is a glaring contradiction between the last sentence quoted
above and the kernel of the plaintiff's case against the defendants.
On the one hand, the plaintiff told a disgruntled shareholder just
three months after the Share Sales that the considered opinion of
its executives was that the availability of trading and earnings
information for the months of November and December, 1999 did
not trigger a duty to make disclosure ... while on the other hand,
just short of two years after the Share Sales, these proceedings,
which stand or fall on the core premise that the very same
information was price-sensitive, were initiated. °9
Third, on January 27 and 28, 2000, Fyffes allowed a company
secretary, Mr. Ellis, and another non-executive director, Mr.
Halpenny, to sell shares and share options in Fyffes." ° Allowing these
sales by other insiders is not consistent with Fyffes' later accusations
against Flavin. These three factors contribute to what Justice Laffoy
views as a fundamental incongruity in the plaintiff's position."
105. Id. at 132.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 136.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 104.
111. Id. at 138.
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Fyffes was not a sympathetic plaintiff who brought a case against
Flavin due to a genuine sense of having been wronged by Flavin.
Instead Fyffes brought the suit against Flavin to avoid an action by its
own, new shareholders who had purchased the shares from Flavin.
112
These shareholders were certainly unhappy, and Fyffes may have
instituted this suit in order to appear to be acting in the interests of
those discontented shareholders. Because Fyffes did not view Flavin
as engaged in insider trading in February 2000, it seems fair that the
plaintiff did not prevail in this instance. Nonetheless that result does
not obviate the wider concern expressed in this note that Justice
Laffoy's formulation of the Section 108(1) test places too heavy a
burden on the plaintiff.
Since the Fyffes v. DCC decision, Part V of the Companies Act
1990 has been replaced by the Investment Funds, Companies and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, which became effective in Ireland on
July 6, 2005. '13 This Act replaces Part V with the Market Abuse
Regulations, moving Ireland closer to a common EU regime for the
detection, investigation, and sanctioning of insider trading."' But
even under this new legal regime, insider trading law in Ireland still
focuses on whether the information is price-sensitive. "5 Hence the
concerns expressed in this note about Justice Laffoy's formulation of
that test remain relevant.
Conclusion
An American court may have viewed Flavin's actions as insider
trading. The Fyffes v. DCC decision reveals that plaintiffs in Irish
insider trading cases face a heavier burden than American plaintiffs
when determining whether information is material. Irish insider
trading law focuses on whether the information is price-sensitive
rather than merely on whether the information is material. As a
result, Irish plaintiffs must demonstrate that the information was so
112. Micheau, supra note 8.
113. Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 2005 (Act
No. 12/2005) (Ir.) available at <www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2005/
al205.pdf>.
114. . Transcript of Dail Eireann Debates, Fine Gael, Feb. 7, 2006, available at
<www.finegael.ie/fine-gael-news.cfm/year/2006/month/2/action/detainewsid/27512/
level/page/aid/138/>; See also Fyffes at 2.
115. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld, LLP, Investment Fund Alert: The
European Market Abuse Directive and the Irish Stock Exchange, Oct. 25, 2005, at 1-4,
available at <www.akingump.com/docs/publication/822.pdf>.
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significant that it would have had a material impact on the company's
share price. If suspect trading occurs during the kind of market
conditions that prevailed in Ireland in early 2000, plaintiffs will have a
difficult time satisfyingthis test. Although not all stock prices rose
during the dot.com era, and some declined temporarily before rising
again, companies with an Internet component often performed
financially well despite bad news about their earnings. Fyffes may not
have been a sympathetic plaintiff, but Justice Laffoy's interpretation
of the Irish statutory test does not bode well for future plaintiffs in
Irish insider trading cases.
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